INTRODUCTION
The elite recruitment pattern both reflects and affects the society As dependent variable it expresses the value system of the society and its degree of consistency and contradictions the degree and type of representativeness of the system the basis of social stratification and its articulation with the political system and the structure and change in political roles As factor which affects change or as an independent variable elite recruitment patterns deter mine avenues for political participation and status influence the kind of policies that will be enacted accelerate or retard changes affect the distribution of status and prestige and influence the stability of the system Professor definition cited above stresses the social component of the elite recruitment process his work on recruitment and indeed most of the literature on the subject has tended to con centrate on the relationship between social structure and political recruitment
In particular this is true of the literature dealing with August 1964 6i2 By political recruitment is meant that function of the political system that recruits members of the particular subcultures religious communities statuses classes ethnic com munities and the like and inducts them into the specialized roles of the political system. Gabriel ALMOND and James COLEMAN eds The Politics of the Developing Areas Princeton 1960 31. elite recruitment in Africa.1 Such an emphasis is more than warrant ed given both the pace of social restructuring in much of Africa under the impact of such forces as western education bureaucratization of colonial administration western technology and the introduction of values associated with the acquisition of specialized modern skills social mobility through achievement and capital accumulation The so-called modernization of African territories however moderniza tion is defined has been associated with the rise of various African elites for whom skill achievement or the acquisition of capital were the key instrumental values in their rise to prominence
The emer gence of these new elites moreover has been usually accompanied by corresponding decline in the importance of the traditional elites who generally owed their positions to the working of older ascriptive criteria of selection These propositions are all essential to any analysis of political elite recruitment in Africa this discussion takes them as given
What is suggested here is that changes in political structure may under certain circumstances affect the pattern of elite recruitment as much if not more than changes in social structure French-speaking West and Equatorial Africa represents an example perhaps unique of political systems or aggregatively before in dependence of system where propositions regarding the relationship between changes in political structure and elite recruitment can be examined with some clarity Their nationalism took the form rather of demands for greater local autonomy for increasing devolution of political power to local elites and for structural reforms that would permit these goals to be reached Complete independence from France was an eventuality that most of them were willing to contemplate only with considerable reluctance in this they reflected the long-standing French hope that some sort of political association with France might be worked out not perhaps the assimilation so dear to pre-war makers of French colonial policy but perhaps an association within the post-war formulas of the French Union and its successor the Community It was the failure of the Community formula reflected in the death of federalist hopes in 1959 plus the example of Guinea and the press of independence movements elsewhere in Africa that finally led them to decide to seek independence.1 The point is that the predicate of elite recruitment in post-war French-speaking Africa was the induction of people who were to be integrated into the evolving associational scheme of FrancoAfrican relations Inasmuch as the political evolution of the French African territories was by and large peaceful in nature2 this meant that recruitment tended to follow the measured structural changes introduced by France during the latter years of its colonial tenure Those who entered the political system therefore were those who were usually intended to do so or to put it another way those whose recruitment was largely organized by the structural changes in the system Among these changes for example must be listed the legis lation 1944 and 1952 Madagascar in 1947 and Cameroon beginning in 1955 In the former case the revolt was put down with great severity and loss of life within year In the latter the revolt reached its heights in 1955 and there after was localized and gradually abated during the next seven years VICTOR LE VINE result of the loi cadre of 1956 and the trend to territorialization growing out of the failure of the federal system) and the creation of the Community product of the French Constitution of 1958 together with the tender of constitutional options that made finally independ ence possible
To this list must be added the advent of the United Nations whose Trusteeship System radically altered the conditions and structure of French tutelage over Togo and Cameroon and whose strong anti-colonial bias acted as spur to decolonization on both French public opinion and successive French governments It is not germane to this discussion to insist that this or that change in French policy was or was not caused by political demands voiced by the African elite Both such demands and external events over which French-speaking Africans had no control such as the Second World War the formation in France of socialist governments ideologi cally committed to decolonization the rise of nationalist movements elsewhere in Africa and the revolution of 13 May that called the Fifth Republic into existence had their effect on the introduction of the structural changes noted above Such an excursion might be interesting but hardly relevant What is significant for our purposes is that elite recruitment could not fail to be inordinately affected by these changes that the Africans recruited to the positions created by these changes had almost of necessity to be men skilled in using the values and techniques of the French to both their own and French ends And as has been suggested these ends tended more often than not to coincide
The picture of the French-speaking African elite that emerges from this analysis particularly in the 1945-1960 period is in broadest strokes that of group that could under different circumstances be called company boys
The members of that elite were the products of system in which the French expected them to assume leadership but not too soon With few exceptions the members of African political elites of French-speaking Africa during this period were not revolutionaries though good many learned to express themselves in the language of the revolutionary but were for want of better term establishmentarians formed within the French colonial system in its waning days Over time of course the establishments became increasingly africanized and with the advent of independence still further structural changes were introduced into the various political system of what had been French Africa Independence for one thing not only removed the last barriers to indigenous recruitment to the political elite but it permitted as the reins of power were passed to African hands the emergence of what Zolberg has aptly characterized as the that is political systems in which dominant or single party comes to man almost completely the apparatus of govern-ment.1 In some cases notably those of Guinea Mali the Central African Republic and the Ivory Coast the party-State emerged as fact of political life even before independence
In any case the party-State represented significant change in the structure of the political systems involved and in turn that change had important consequences for the patterns of elite recruitment This point will be discussed in greater detail later suffice for the present to point out that insofar as the party-State succeeded in gaining the support of most of the politically relevant strata of the system its base of recruitment became significantly broader than had previously been the case As was however frequently the case dissenters the frustrated and the alienated grouped or were grouped into opposition and almost by definition found themselves excluded from the system In the latter circumstances both the channels and the bases of political recruitment tented to contract party regularity and loyalty became all too often the primary operative criteria for induction into the governing elite One other important form of change in the structure of the polit ical systems in French-speaking Africa must be mentioned before turning to detailed examination of some of the propositions suggested above that is the military coup Some four This discussion has thus far avoided the problem of defining the characteristics of the political elites in French-speaking Africa prob lem that must now be faced before specific relationships between elite recruitment and structural changes in the political system can be suggested
The problem is not easily resolved since there are few if any definitions of political elite much less of that satisfy the demands of inclusiveness and analogical comparability On simple empirical grounds parameters of elite membership based on such factors or an agglomerate of such factors as wealth status superior education class prestige achievement and the like fail not
Aristide ZOLBERG Creating Political Order The Party-States of West Africa New York 1966 because they do not provide measures of elite inclusion or exclusion but because they either include too many or too few.1 This is not the place to engage in yet another discourse on the subject but suffice it for our purposes to suggest that analysis of any particular elite tends to be very much function of the definition or indeed of the research design of the person making the analysis For the purposes of this discussion therefore we suggest two types of political elites in French-speaking Africa the traditional and the
The traditional elites we define to include the occupants of positions of formal power in those societies whose political systems still retain in some significant sense structures existing before the advent of colonialism or who were permitted by the French colonial adminis tration to operate under rules different from those applied to French men or to those immediately associated with them
Here are for example good many chefs de canton selected because they would combine modern skills with traditional legitimation the lamibe2 of Northern Cameroon the Muslim chiefs and marabouts3 of Niger Chad and Mauritania the Mogho Naba and his subordinate chiefs among the Mossi of Upper Volta and the marabouts and grands marabouts of the Muslim confréries religious orders of Senegal
In some instances the traditional elites have retained considerable power and autonomy within the new African States
The economic power of the Mouridiya order in Senegal for example serves to give the grand marabout of that order Elhaj Falilou bake truly extraordinary political leverage within the modern government of President Leopold Senghor Simi larly the power base of the Northern Cameroonian lamibe has been eroded but hardly destroyed by President Ahidjo their influence is attested by the fact some six of these northern magnates still 1966 occupy seats in the East Cameroon Assembly
In other contexts such as Upper Volta where the Mogho Naba retains only ritual functions they count for very little As political elite whether Peter LLOYD in his introductory chapter to The New Elites of Tropi cal Africa noted minimal agreement on dennition of the elite as those persons who were Western-educated and wealthy to high degree relative to the mass of the population minimum annual income limit of 230 was suggested as guide
The definition not bad one would nevertheless exclude number of traditional leaders operating in modern positions who have no income in the ordinary sense For example good many Senegalese marabouts who perform administrative functions for their followers and the government live almost completely on donations from their followers The grand marabout of the Muridiya in Senegal neither reads nor writes French speaks that language poorly is nevertheless considered by many to be the second most powerful man in Senegal after President Senghor) Lamibe sing. lamido are Fulani traditional rulers in Nigeria they might be called emirs Marabouts are holy men leaders of and within various Islamic orders cults brotherhoods in West Africa directly relevant to the modern system or not this group retains at least visibility and its members must be taken into account if only because of the constituencies of traditional loyalty that they represent
The modern elites we define to include those who participate in the modern political culture of French-speaking Africa to the extent that they occupy formal and informal positions of authority in govern mental executives legislatures judiciaries and bureaucracies or in modern associational structures such as political parties trade unions and functional economic interest groups.1 Some members of the traditional elite participate in the modern elite sometimes in positions of real authority in governments or ruling parties more often than not in positions where their authority the modern political system is circumscribed by situational constraints as for example member ship in local and national legislatures
The reverse also occurs but less frequently because the representation of members of modern elites in the traditional elite systems tends to be mainly symbolic witness to the traditional elites recognition of the new facts of political life President Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast for example is also Baoule traditional chief but presently only by co-optation and in purely honorific sense
The definition of political elite in Frenchspeaking Africa moreover is clouded by the fact that membership in the elite is claimed by most people who have acquired modern secondary and higher education Membership in the elite for example appeared to be assumed by the sample francophone African students in France reached by J.-P Diayes survey in 1961.2 Under the circumstances therefore the most useful analyses of the francophone African elite are those that analytically isolate certain elite groups within the broader elite category
We propose for the purposes of this discussion to examine solely the governing defined specifically by position in legislatures governmental executives and bureaucraties
IV
RECRUITMENT AND LEGISLATURES IN FRENCH WEST AFRICA 1946 -1962 Prior to the extraordinary changes in political representation that followed World War II Africans in French Africa participated in colonial deliberative or consultative organs only in the most restricted Despite the operation of the dual electoral college system employed in all territories save Senegal which had the effect of grossly underrepresenting African electors from the nrst the Territorial Assemblies operated with African second college majorities
As the franchise was progressively extended to more and more citoyens de statut local second college electors the sizes of the various Assemblies grew as well with the consequence that the African majorities became even larger
In 1956 the distinc tions between the first and second colleges were abolished the Assemblies were also enlarged and Executive Councils were introduc ed to give Africans what amounted to decisive voice over large areas of territorial concerns.2 The Assemblies became Parliaments in 1958 and the Executive Councils were transformed for all intents and purposes into territorial governments
The net effect of these changes for our purposes was the progressive enlargement of the elite recruit ment base changes that were reflected to an extraordinary extent in the composition of the governing elite Illustrative of the relationship between structural changes and the composition of the governing elite is the occupational composition of the second college representatives in the Territorial Assemblies between 1946 and 1957) and in the legislatures as whole from 1957 to 1962
The data summarized in Table  are Table  What is at once striking but not unexpected is the fact that well over 50 of the total recruited to the 1946-1952 Assemblies were products of the colonial system itself that is they were those trained for and within it That civil servants administrators and educators at all levels should be recruit ed for the first Territorial Assemblies is quite natural given the fact that they more than any other group of non-Europeans in the colonial society had succeeded not only in coming to terms with the system but more important had learned to operate successfully within its constraints Indeed notes Professor Morgenthau of these people had they been disqualified it is difficult to see where alternative educated candidates might have been found to fill political offices.3 True to the French tradition civil servants in Africa were already highly politicized and when the reforms of 1946 were put into effect they and the educators eagerly entered the electoral lists be it under the banner of metropolitan party of so-called parti adminis tration colonial government-sponsored party) or of an African list Whichever it was is irrelevant for our purposes the fact remains that given the paucity of Africans with education and/or skills in government or politics given the creation of new set of politically relevant elite positions those with experience within the system were more frequently recruited to fill these positions than were those lacking such qualifications It is interesting further to note how this pattern persists over time there is only 6.3 spread between the highest and lowest percentages in the four sets of figures 1946-1962 for the category Government employees Even these percentages are somewhat misleading since many of the persons clas sified under Liberal professions particularly doctors infirmiers veterinary doctors medical assistants were either wholly or partially paid by the administration very rough calculation suggests that perhaps 60 of the 1946-1952 1952-1957 1957-1958 This figure only reflects those deputies who declared no other primary occupation than syndicaliste or similar designation In fact 27 deputies had either been at one time or were still in addition to their other occupationstrade union leaders This latter number was entered in parentheses ence of this pattern is the fact that large number of this group perhaps 30 were re-elected to successive legislatures However the Assemblies themselves increased in membership over time and re-election can only account for numerically small number of those in this general category More important in all probability is the fact that government increasingly became the principal employer in the territories Again it was expertise and political skill acquired within the system as it developed that appears to have been one of the chief criteria of eligibility for recruitment to the legislatures The increases in the numbers and percentages of persons within the second major category Liberal professions appears also to be largely function of changes in the structure of the systems involved that is in this case newer and broader educational opportunities particularly in higher education
Prior to World War the number of Africans educated in metropolitan French schools was negligible after 1946 opportunities for technical and higher education in France were extended to thousands of French-speaking Africans.1 These upon returning to Africa either joined the ranks of administration or entered into the practice of one of the liberal professions
In addi tion number of secondary and higher educational institutions were opened in French Africa itself the most important being universities in Dakar and Abidjan One other set of data from Table needs some comment at this point and that is the decline in the percentages of those individuals under the Chiefs rubric In 1946 given the low level of political participation and political party activity throughout the territories of French West Africa various traditional and quasi-traditional rulers represented important areas of real power and electoral strength They frequently formed and headed their own electoral lists and were often elected by what could only be described as commandeered vote French version of indirect rule had preserved large number of them as useful adjuncts of colonial rule permitting them to retain traditional authority and status in the measure that they were willing to co-operate with the colonial administration. The percentages were computed from the data on birthdates given in the Annuaire parlementaire... in many instances no birthdate was given
The first is the number for which birthdates were given the second in parentheses is the total number of legislators Territorial Assembly in French Africa contained its share of chiefs Since 1957 their numbers have increasingly diminished in relation to the growth of the legislatures themselves and it has only been in those territories where they were most powerful Mali Niger Upper Volta Mauritania Cameroon Chad that they continued to be repre sented Even in these territories their numbers dwindled after each election What accounts for their decreasing numbers and influence in the legislatures Two things most probably the inroads on their authority made by political parties who could only proselytize at the chiefs expense in their the areas and the determina tion of African-dominated national executives after 1957 to either reduce the chiefs to impotence or in any case to abate the widelycondemned evil of tribal particularism of which the chiefs were the principal and often the most conveniently available symbols.1 As the structure of territorial politics changed it is clear that the chiefs came increasingly to be considered irrelevant to the emerging polity
The point need not be further belabored whatever else social background analysis of the political elite here legislators in French Africa can tell us it does suggest most strongly that changes in the structure of the political system itself did tend to channel to new political roles the very people for which those roles had been designed This is not to suggest that changes in social structure did not contrib ute to the recruitment process as it must have nor does the state ment simply state the obvious It is after all relatively rare polity in which direct connection between recruitment and structural change can be anticipated with some confidence by those making the changes The colonial situation in French Africa was perhaps anomalous pre cisely for that reason. Some additional and different data not presented in Table  may help to reinforce the point These data are on the average ages of legislators between 1946 and 1962 arrayed on Table  and significant age distributions of legislators in the 1958-1962 legislatures arrayed in Table 3)  Table  suggests most forcibly decline in the average age of President Ahmadou Ahidjo of the Cameroon reflected some of this deter mination in blunt warning to the Cameroonian chiefs administered at the Third Party Congress of the Union Camerounaise in 1960 It is no secret to anyone that certain chiefs consider it almost profane violation of forbidden reserve that others than themselves organize and lead inhabitants in their chiefdoms solemnly call upon these chiefs to surpass themselves so that they may fall in step with our imperatives If they will accept the neces sary efforts if they will consent in spirit of fair play to certain sacrifices they will avoid an evil whose symptoms are already becoming apparent If they wait if they resist certain measures certain evolutionary measures this evil once unleashed will be fatal to them Cited by Victor LE VINE Came roun in James COLEMAN and Carl ROSBERG eds. Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa Berkeley 1964 152 and 153 12. Without fuller information on the 1946-1957 legislators unavailable at the time this was written we can only speculate on the relatively high age averages during those years The occupational breakdown data suggest one hypothesis those recruited were middle-level civil servants professionals quasi-professionals trained before the war and in Africa plus chiefs and notables most of them appointed or legitimized before the war By 1957 however expanded educational opportunities both in France and in Africa) plus the activities of political parties and other modern organizations had begun to produce new and younger generation of recruitable leaders to fill elite positions being created locally and territorially The principal emphasis of this discussion has been thus far upon the relationships between elite recruitment and legislative political structures
We turn now to other structural changes in francophone Africa but due both to limitations in the data and the more tentative nature of the conclusions to be drawn that discussion will be much shorter
More intensive research will hope fill out the bare bones of the propositions that follow By July 1962 all French-speaking West and Equatorial African States except Gabon had become formally or de facto single partyStates
In six of these States the so-called parti unique had been installed before independence Senegal Mali Guinea Ivory Coast the Central African Republic Niger) in one of these the CAR there had been only one party since 1950 and only in the brief five months in 1960 that it took for one small opposition party to rise and be outlawed was that country anything else than single party-State.3
Data computed on the basis of biographies kindly provided me by the Secretary General of the Dahomean National Assembly in 1965
The age frequencies given in Tables  and  are significant not only in that they demonstrate the relatively youthful composition of many African legislatures but also when compared with similar data from other industrializ ed countries in that they suggest that the structure of the system does in fact affect the age at which individuals are recruited to its elites In the African case at least it would appear that relatively young political systems tend to recruit younger men In the rest the single party-State followed as was noted within two and half years after independence The conversion of multi party-to single party-political system insofar as it represented fundamental change in the system and in several of these States where one party had already established durable hegemony the change went almost unnoticed affected elite recruitment in at least two discernible ways Recruitment to legislatures often became one of the chief rewards for political fidelity and the Assemblies came increasingly to be composed of local and party chiefs party workers of long standing loyalty and notables satisfied to have their influence and worth rewarded with symbolic rather than substantive national political role It need hardly be added that by and large legislative elections became more plebiscites to show support for the regime than arenas of political contest. In any case the incomplete data avail able suggests that after the francophone African States became single party States their legislatures tended increasingly to be populated not only by establishmentarians but by apparatchiki as well
In fact examination of the career patterns of the 1958-1962 legislatures discussed previously all of them parti unique Assemblies indicates that it is establishmentarians that make up goodly portion of the faithful party militants and are for that reason attractive candidates for induction into the legislatures Though there is no direct evidence to support the hypothesis it is likely for example that the increase in the percentage of the government-employed in the 1964 Dahomean legislature as compared to the 1960 Assembly 87 from 73 an increase of 14 is due precisely to the fact that the reservoir of recruitables for the 1964 Assembly multiple party-legislature came from the same place as did those recruited to the PDU-dominated legislature of 1960 only that in 64 there were fewer recruitables left outside the establishment reservoirs
The Party became the principal recruiter to elite positions in the system and as consequence tended to channel the best recruits into either the national executive and administration or into the Party itself Legislatures qua legislatures became devalued and acquired larger ceremonial ritual and symbolic functions as they lost their legislative importance
The legislature in effect became ter minal not steppingstone for political careers One interesting consequence of this de-emphasis has been that cabinet ministers in most of the francophone States no longer need be members of legis latures and in fact very few ministers of government were drawn from the ranks of legislators after 1962
Indeed in the eight States of former French West Africa it was the advent of independence more than the turn to the party State that occasioned the most The data on cabinet changes for these States is summarized in Table 5 .
Of the eight States only the Niger and Togolese post-independence cabinets did not change appreciably
In the other six independence not only provided the opportunity to add new cabinet posts and new personnel to fill them but also permitted the new African govern ments to eliminate old opponents holdovers that owed their positions to the colonial regime deadwood and expatriates whose positions could now be filled by Africans.1 Independence therefore lifted the last barriers to the africanization of governments and permitted important structural revisions designed to recruit newer and often younger leaders into the governing elites Independence had little appreciable effect on recruitment to the eight National Assemblies except to the extent that that event hastened the coming of the single party-State
In general however independence did affect elite recruitment in more subtle way than the gross data on recruitment to legislatures and governments suggest on their face
Research conducted in five francophone States in 1965 indicates that insofar as the advent of independence generated high expectations of post-independence payoffs in political economic and social goods and to the extent that governments were perceived to have failed to deliver after independence recruitment to elite positions in governing parties executives and bureaucracies fell off appreciably in the younger elite category Both younger and older members of the political elite tended to see independence as point of reference Not all expatriates were eliminated for example André Peytavin French financial expert remained in the Senegalese cabinet until 1965 as did Raphael Sailer West Indian from Martinique in the Ivorian cabinet until 1966 to describe cleavage between them and members of both groups voiced concern over the fact that recruitment of younger persons was becoming more rather than less difficult Second generation i.e post-independence-elite members tended to withdraw from active participation in the dominant party and to await hypothetical but sure changing of the guard low sense of political efficacy among first generation pre-independence elite members may perhaps have facilitated even speeded military coups in Dahomey Upper Volta and the Central African Republic.1 Finally word about the military coups in francophone Africa and their effect on elite recruitment There can be no question but that the military takeovers in Dahomey Upper Volta the Central African Republic and Togo during 1965-1966 radically altered the structure of the political systems in each of the countries involved if only because in each case important elite structures were closed down abolished or simply suspended for an indefinite period Political par ties and legislatures were abolished or suspended and the former civilian administrations were purged of the most prominent supporters of the old regime
In effect the former predicates of elite recruitment were generally either scrapped or thoroughly overhauled
The new postcoup governments significantly bearing such designations as Com mittee of National and the like were heavily manned by military men and interestingly enough by younger technically competent members of the administrative and bureaucratic elites In Dahomey for example number of second-generation elite mem bers who had held high positions during the first Soglo interregnum October 1963-January 1964 again found places in the first post-coup governments of General Soglo January 1966).2 Only few members of the older elite have thus far found top positions in the four military regimes one example Dr Emile Zinsou was Dahomean Foreign Minister until the coup of December 1976) and it appears that so long as the military rulers of these States cling to the assumptions on which they based their coups recruitment to the governing elite will be both highly selective and extremely restrictive LE VINE Political Leadership Ibid. pp 79 and 112 43
